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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-4417 
___________ 
 
ROSCHEIM WILKERSON, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SUPERINTENDENT SOMERSET SCI; CORRECTIONAL OFFICER CONN; 
CAPTAIN SNYDER; UNIT MANAGER WESTLEY; GRIEVANCE COORDINATOR 
HEIDI STROKA; CHIEF GRIEVANCE OFFICER KERI MOORE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-13-cv-00203) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 17, 2014 
 
Before:  JORDAN, COWEN  and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  July 22, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Roscheim Wilkerson, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order 
dismissing his complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
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 Wilkerson, a Pennsylvania prisoner at SCI-Somerset, filed a complaint pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that on or about April 2, 2013, Corrections Officer (“C.O.”) 
Conn denied his request to use a restroom by stating, “No, you will not be allowed to use 
that restroom to perform any homosexual acts.”  C.O. Conn allegedly made additional, 
unspecified “disturbing and homophobic” comments at that time.  Dkt. No. 3, at 2.  
Wilkerson also alleged that his grievance arising from C.O. Conn’s statements was 
mishandled, causing him to miss the relevant deadline for his second appeal.  Wilkerson 
contended that this was a “cover-up.”  Id. at 4-6.  Wilkerson also alleged that C.O. Conn 
and other prison officials retaliated against him due to his filing of a grievance, both by 
causing other inmates to “jok[e] and mimic[]” him, id., and by his being “‘black-balled’ 
from employment, classes, or any other enity [sic] that would help me financially or 
educationally.”  Id. at 9.   
 A Magistrate Judge screened Wilkerson’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915A, and recommended dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim and 
granting leave to amend.  Wilkerson filed objections to the report and recommendation, 
but did not file an amended complaint.  The District Court adopted the Magistrate 
Judge’s report and recommendation, dismissed the complaint and stated, without 
analysis, that further leave to amend would be inequitable.  Wilkerson timely appealed. 
 We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We may 
affirm on any basis supported by the record.  Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (per curiam).  We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal 
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order.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  Dismissal is 
appropriate where the pleader has not alleged “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
678 (2009) (internal quotations omitted).  Dismissal of a pro se plaintiff’s complaint 
without leave to amend is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) only when amendment 
of the complaint would be inequitable or futile.  Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 
F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).   
 Upon review, we conclude that the District Court correctly determined that 
Wilkerson’s complaint should be dismissed without leave to amend, as none of the facts 
alleged in the complaint constituted a viable claim.  Wilkerson’s claim based on the 
statements made by C.O. Conn was properly dismissed.  Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997e(e), an inmate cannot bring a civil action for emotional injury without a prior 
showing of a physical injury.  Since Wilkerson was essentially claiming that he was 
belittled by C.O. Conn’s statements without any physical altercation or injury, § 1997e(e) 
would prevent this claim and render amendment futile.  Wilkerson’s argument in reliance 
on Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857 (2d Cir. 1997), is unavailing, as that case held that 
“[t]he isolated episodes of harassment and touching alleged by [the plaintiff] are 
despicable and, if true, they may potentially be the basis of state tort actions. But they do 
not involve a harm of federal constitutional proportions as defined by the Supreme 
Court.”  Id. at 861 (quotations and citations omitted).   
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 Wilkerson’s claim that his grievance was mishandled was also properly dismissed.  
Prisoners do not have a constitutional right to prison grievance procedures, nor do they 
have a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause in those procedures.  See 
Hoover v. Watson, 886 F. Supp. 410, 418 (D. Del. 1995), aff’d, 74 F.3d 1226 (3d Cir. 
1995) (holding that if a state elects to provide a grievance mechanism, violations of its 
procedures do not give rise to a § 1983 claim); see also Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 
647 (7th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases and stating that “[t]he courts of appeals that have 
confronted the issue are in agreement that the existence of a prison grievance procedure 
confers no liberty interest on a prisoner.”).  Accordingly, it would have been futile for the 
District Court to permit Wilkerson to amend this claim.   
 Wilkerson’s final claim, which alleged that he experienced retaliation as a result of 
filing his grievance, was also properly dismissed without leave to amend.  The elements 
of a retaliation claim are: (1) constitutionally protected conduct, (2) an adverse action by 
prison officials that is sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his 
constitutional rights, and (3) a causal link between the exercise of his constitutional rights 
and the adverse action taken against him.  Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 
2003) (internal quotations omitted).  The requisite causal connection can be demonstrated 
by “(1) an unusually suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and 
the allegedly retaliatory action, or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing to 
establish a causal link.”  Lauren W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007).  
Wilkerson merely stated that he was being retaliated against; he did not plead any facts 
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that would satisfy the causation element of his retaliation claim.  Likewise, his appellate 
brief does not suggest that he could supplement the facts supplied in the complaint, and 
instead characterizes the alleged impediments to his vocational and educational activities 
as discrimination.  We therefore conclude that the dismissal of his complaint without 
leave to amend was proper. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
 
